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'Oh what a goodly outside falsehood hath' Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice
THE CONTEXT
Accelerating Change
In all history there has never been a period as dramatic
for the scale and scope of unexpected changes in the
human condition as the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Among the less obvious of these changes have been
those in the realities of rural life and conditions in the
South. But changes there also appear to be accelerating.
The revolution in communications is increasingly
touching rural people: in some parts of the South, not
just radios, but television and videos are to be found in
villages. In some economies, urban-style consumer
goods are more and more demanded and available. In
others, war, civil disorder, drought and famine have
driven people dramatically down into destitution.
Almost everywhere, in different ways, and in different
directions, change - often rapid, often unpredictable
seems increasingly the norm.
At the same time, though slower, less striking and less
obvious, there have been steady shifts of view of the
ends and means of development and of the role of the
State. Three clusters of view can be distinguished
(Chambers 1991): neo-Fabian, neo-Liberal, and third,
an ideology of reversals of the normal. The neo-Fabian
ideology, which gave the State a major direct role in
development, is a survival from the 1970s and earlier;
the neo-Liberal is a creature of the 1 980s; and the third
ideology has been evolving and coalescing over a long
period, but gaining support and coherence in the 1980s.
The normative thrusts and themes of this third
ideology or paradigm include:
- putting people before things, and poor people first;
- development through learning process rather than
blueprint;
- decentralization, democracy, and diversity (to
value local knowledge, participation and small
group and community action);
- open and effective communications and access.
What is especially new is the value placed on adaptive
and iterative rather than linear processes, on learning
and changing rather than implementing a set plan, on
differentness, on empowering local groups, and on
demand from below.
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Normal Professionalism and Bureaucracy
While these ideas gain currency especially among
intellectuals and non-government organizations
(NGOs), two inert masses maintain the status quo, and
insulate decision-making elites from the changing rural
realities.
The first is normal professionalism - the ideas,
thinking, methods and behaviour dominant in
professions. Normal professionalism reproduces itself
through hierarchical learning, university curricula and
examinations, textbooks written by middle-aged
academics, mostly men, professional societies, journal
editors, and the traditions and rewards of government
departments into which graduates pass after university
and college. It values things more than people,
numbers more than judgements, high technology more
than low, and whatever is urban, industrial, clean and
hard more than whatever is rural, agricultural, dirty
and soft.
The second is normal bureaucracy, meaning the
characteristics of large, especially government, organi-
zations. Normal bureaucracy reproduces itself in the
Weberian idiom as professionals climb the ladders of
hierarchy by conforming to convention, avoiding error
and abjuring innovation. Normal bureaucracy values
central authority, control, standardization, regularity,
conformity, and quantitative targets.
Normal professionalism and normal bureaucracy are
antithetical to the new views of development. In the
State, they combine to resist the new paradigm. Among
rural development professionals, though, some changes
are slowly occurring. These are reflected in the
burgeoning literature on local knowledge (also
described as indigenous technical knowledge,
indigenous agricultural knowledge, rural people's
knowledge .
.
.), on development alternatives, on the
NGO sector, on gender, on the environment, and on
people's participation.
In contrast, normal government development bureau-
cracy appears resiliently static, robustly buffered
against change. Yet major changes are implied by and
required for the new approaches to development. The
challenge with such bureaucracy is to find points of
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leverage for change. The search for means of
bureaucratic reorientation is not a new enterprise (see
e.g. Korten and Alfonso 1981). But two aspects of
bureaucracy have been relatively neglected: standardi-
zation, and false feedback, In search of explanation and
prescription, this paper analyses these in some of their
manifestations, drawing examples from Indian field
bureaucracy.
Administrative Stasis
Indian field bureaucracy does change in the
programmes which it carries out. The steady flow of
books by retired administrators about rural develop-
ment in India during their lifetimes makes this clear. In
devising and promulgating programmes there has been
imagination and inventiveness. Special programme has
followed special programme - for different types of
disadvantaged district, for different types of dis-
advantaged person, for the development of water and
wastelands, for social forestry, seasonal employment,
credit, productive assets for the poor, midday meals for
school children, housing for vulnerable groups, adult
literacy, and much else.
At the same time Indian field bureaucracy changes
little in its structure and norms. These reproduce
themselves. Innovations are absorbed and transformed
with reversion to type. The same District Admini-
stration headed by a Collector or Magistrate, and with a
hierarchy of Block Development Officers and lower
staff, implements many of the programmes. Planning is
top-down. Ideas are conceived in De]hi or in the State
capitals and promulgated as instructions with funds to
be disbursed and targets to be achieved, Districts and
Blocks are told what to do. Whatever the programme,
the style is the same, or becomes the same. One
programme, DWCRA, for women's employment, was
initiated in the early 1 980s with a planning workshop in
Delhi. It was agreed unanimously that no targets
should be set; but within a year targets were there. It is
as though there is a top-down magnetic field in which
individual magnets cannot be turned around. The
central conception is standardized and transmitted
through the field for peripheral implementation, with
targets set at each level. What is to be done can change;
but how it is to be done is determined by a dutiful
homeostasis.
The stable continuity of Indian administration, can be
partly understood in terms of three pervasive aspects:
culture, conservatism and corruption. Cultural
dimensions appear significant. Hierarchy is a deep
structure in Indian culture, thought and behaviour.
Linked with this, the Hindu concept of dharma, or
'duty', is a strong force. Stanley Heginbotham's
observations 15 years ago still apply, notably at the
lower levels of administration:
the dharmic tradition provides its adherents with
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a set of norms relating to work that differ in many
important ways from the norms of a growth-and
change-oriented society. It does not prepare an
individual for situations of work çverload. The
concept of setting priorities is a foreign one, as is the
notion of calculating costs and benefits in order to
determine optimal work strategies. One does not
strive to achieve results, nor does one feel concern if
the performance of one's duty produces what
appear to be undesired consequences. One keeps to
established procedures and standards - neither
seeking innovations nor quality of work that exceeds
the traditional system-maintaining norms.
(Heginbotham 1975: 34)
Hierarchy and the dharmic tradition reinforce the
second aspect, the conservatism found at the lower
levels of most bureaucracies. A preference is shown for
behaviour which is correct and approved. Rules and
procedures may be bent or used in ways not intended,
but the outward form is respected, giving a sort of
liturgical pleasure to those who master its sequences
and observances, even when it is exploited for private
rents. Procedures tend to be additive: new ones are
superimposed upon old. Rules and lists tend to be for
ever, reproduced more or less faithfully, unless there is
strong reason to change them; and when there is reason
to change, adding and patching are preferred to
abolition or restructuring.
The third factor is corruption. This includes informal
fees, division of spoils, and the transfer trade. Informal
fees for services rendered vary by region but are
sometimes almost formal - with a well known and well
understood fee for obtaining a form, registering a land
title, and so on. Division of spoils from kickbacks
reportedly follows well established 'bureaucratic'
norms, with set percentages from contracts and other
illicit monies which are distributed as rents to different
officers, especially at the lower levels. At higher levels,
as analysed by Wade (1984) and corroborated by
articles in the press, the transfer trade is widespread.
Officials buy posts from the politicians who control
them. Partly in consequence, the frequency of transfer
from post to post 'is typically so high as to make
difficult any engagement between the official and his
particular responsibilities' (ibid). There are officers
who courageously stand out against this system. But
generally, in these circumstances, there is little
incentive or opportunity for an official to institute
reforms. Indeed, where they do so, a penal posting can
be the prompt reward: Arun Bhatia, the Collector of
Dhule District in Maharashtra who exposed corruption
in the Employment Guarantee Scheme was quickly
given the opportunity to exercise his talents as officer in
charge of the Maharashtra Government's filing system.
The transfer trade is a slipping clutch in development,
oiled by money and preventing engagement and
effective drive.
The effects are conservative. Lower-level staff have a
strong financial stake in the status quo. An analysis of
who would gain and who lose from reforms in
groundwater exploitation and in forestry has suggested
that almost any reform would reduce their incomes
(Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989: 232). For their
part, middle-level and senior officers involved in the
transfer trade need to recover the outlays and redeem
the commitments made to obtain their posts, and to
make a profit. If they threaten vested interests, or stay
outside the system, they are vulnerable to transfer to
penal postings or backwaters. The incentives and
disincentives of the system make it a model of
sustainability.
Fordism: the 'Model T' Mode
Culture, conservatism and corruption reinforce the
top-down tendencies found also in other field
bureaucracies. Hierarchical culture resonates with
normal bureaucratic culture. Conservatism maintains
central authority. Corruption presents incentives for
rules which inconvenience the public and create
leverage for rent-seeking officials. There are then
cultural, procedural and personal reasons for centralized
insensitivity.
This permits another phenomenon, the promotion of
standardized development packages. This has been
described as 'Fordist'. The term 'Fordist' refers to
mass batch production as an industrial process
associated with Henry Ford the First, and epitomized
in his supposed remark that Americans could have their
Model T Ford any colour they liked as long as it was
black. Bureaucratic, top-down development is similarly
standardized and driven by supply. A Fordist or
'Model T' approach has been common in Indian rural
development: in the early green revolution in
Northwest India you could, as it were, plant any wheat
you liked as long as it was the new HYV Sonora; in
social forestry, at one time, you could plant any tree you
liked as long as it was eucalyptus; in parts of the
Gangetic plains you could have any public tubewell
you liked as long as it was a World Bank tubewell.
To understand this 'Model T' phenomenon better, let
us examine four other examples of Indian rural
development programmes: the Training and Visit
(T and V) system of agricultural extension; the
warabandi system of water distribution on canal
irrigation; watershed development; and the Integrated
Rural Development Programme (IRDP).
First, the Training and Visit system represented an
attempt at bold and radical change. Earlier, agricultural
extension was undertaken by Village Level Workers
(VLWs) responsible not only to the Department or
Ministry of Agriculture, but also to other departments.
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VLWs were often expected to implement an impossible
number and variety of programmes. They were
overwhelmed and buried under geological layers of
instructions from different masters. Reporting
requirements alone took much of their time. T and V
was a management system (Benor and Harrison 1977;
Benor et al 1984) which sought to make them
responsible only for agriculture and only to one
department, to programme their work so that their
supervisors would know each day where they were and
what they were doing, and to institute regular meetings
and training. They were to propagate and popularize
appropriate packages of practices through contact
farmers, who would be in touch with other non-contact
farmers.
T and V was introduced in most Indian states. Much
evidence suggested that the reality was far from the
theory (see e.g. Moore 1984, 1986; Howell 1988).
Common weaknesses were that extension staff in
practice often continued to have many responsibilities;
that good extension recommendations were often not
available from research; and that standard packages
were not sensible for the diverse and difficult
conditions of much Indian farming. By the late 1980s
promotion had given way to post-mortem as the
dominant style of discussions of T and V, which was
more and more spoken of in the past tense.
The second example is the warabandi system of canal
irrigation water distribution. This entails timed turns
for farmers to take water (for a fuller account see
Chambers l988a: 92-99). Warabandi is successfully
practised in Northwest India where four conditions are
met: water is scarce and rainfall low; landholdings are
consolidated with clear ownership; channels lead to
individual fields; and a constant flow can physically be
assured through the outlet which supplies a group of
farmers. In these conditions, farmers will accept timed
turns proportional to their land, and will irrigate at
night. These conditions are, however, rare in India
outside the Northwest. But this did not deter the
Seventh Five Year Plan from setting a target of
8 million hectares to be brought under new warabandi
during the plan period (GOl 1985: 96).
Attempts were dutifully made to introduce the
warabandi blueprint rapidly into widely differing
environments. But since the necessary preconditions
rarely existed, the outcome was almost universal
failure. Boards giving names and times for taking water
were erected on canals; but they were a facade. Almost
everywhere, farmers ignored them. They can be found
standing there still, relics for future bureaucratic
archeologists, with rust and fading paint giving the lie
to official fantasy.
Watershed management provides a third case of top-
down standardization. Mounting concerns about
deforestation, erosion, siltation, the drying up of
springs, and other forms of environmental degradation
led in the 1980s to a strong drive for watershed
development and management. In at least 40 pilot
watersheds, treatments were undertaken, leading to
scaling up and a momentum for much larger
programmes, some with World Bank support. In the
scaled up programmes, if not in the pilot projects,
treatments were standardized. Professionally, the
approach was that of engineers. Works were of set
designs, and often constructed in the field without
regard for local topography, let alone farmers'
knowledge, technology or wishes. Physical and
disbursement targets were set, and despite a rhetoric of
participation, implementation was top-down.
An example is the Maheshwaram watershed near
Hyderabad. There the uniform treatments changed
over the years, but not the style. Contour earth bunds
were standard at first, but then varied and replaced by
vegetative bunds of khus grass (Vetiveria
zizanioides), a technology promoted with enthusiastic
World Bank support over large and diverse areas of
India, and indeed of the world. A special study of the
Maheshwaram programme (Sitapathi Rao et al 1989)
found many shortcomings, and stated that:
what is being done as part of soil and water
conservation activity. . . appears to be execution of
these measures as per a set pattern, to achieve the
target coverage. The anxiety of the field staff could
be seen in their efforts to achieve the targets, as this
is the only point of discussion in the monthly and
quarterly review. The scope for any initiative at the
field level to observe and modify the activities is
very much restricted because of the regimented
approach.
(ibid: 59)
The study also found lack of consultation and
participation, ploughing in of bunds by dissatisfied
farmers who never wanted them in the first place,
erosion actually resulting from anti-erosion bunds, and
cause for doubt about the universal efficacy of khus
grass. Nevertheless, the Government proceeded with
plans for massive expansion of watershed programmes
during the following (Eighth) Plan period.
The fourth example is the Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme (IRDP). This vast programme seeks
through subsidized credit to provide families who are
below the poverty line with income-earning assets
which will enable them to move above the poverty line.
Each administrative Block has had an annual target of
600 households to receive loans and assets. This target
presents a considerable administrative strain. Lists are
meant to be drawn up of households below the poverty
line, and enterprises identified for them to undertake.
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These, one might expect, would have tobe quite varied
in any environment, in order to exploit different
economic niches. But in practice, the programme has
tended to standardize, which makes it less demanding
administratively and easier to routinize corruption. In
consequence, certain enterprises have been over-
subscribed. Milch buffaloes have been the most
common, although in several respects (lumpiness, risk,
fodder requirements, dry periods with no income) they
are unsuitable for very poor people. In a village of 143
households in Uttar Pradesh, the pattern was different:
of 26 IRDP loans, 12 were issued for 'shop-keeping',
and another eight were issued by the same bank for the
same purpose over the same period. Only four of the
IRDP recipients had a 'shop' of any sort, and there was
no scope for 20 shops in such a small village (pers comm
Jean Dreze).
Detailed village-level studies in a social anthropological
mode (summarized in Dreze 1990) have shown the
IRDP to have been, in most parts of India (the
exception being West Bengal), an unusually bad
programme. Corruption has been almost universal; the
beneficiaries have often been the better off; and poor
people have quite often become poorer as a result of
loans and loss of assets or failure of enterprises. Yet the
IDRP remains the major thrust of the Government's
anti-poverty programme.
In these four domains - agricultural extension, the
distribution of canal irrigation water, watershed
development, and the IRDP - the analogy between
'Model T' batch production and rural development
packages holds quite well on the supply side, of what
the factory or the bureaucracy provide. But the analogy
breaks down on the side of the customer, client or
beneficiary. To survive, a factory must produce what
people will buy: the market is the discipline. There is no
comparable discipline with the State. When rural
programmes do not fit what people need and want, it
might be thought that those responsible for planning
would learn and change. But this has happened only
slowly. In the four cases I have discussed standardized
rules of behaviour standard outputs continued to be the
norm even when they worked badly or did not work at
all. When there was feedback and change did occur, as
with watershed programmes, the tendency was to
switch from one standard prescription to another,
rather than to add to the options. In psychologists'
jargon, this is 'slot-rattling', keeping the same slots but
putting different items in them, rather than changing
the slots themselves. So some rural development
remains stuck in the Fordist era of mass production.
There is then a question to be answered. When field
level realities suggest widespread misfit and failure,
how is it that 'Model T' programmes continue to be
planned and implemented? There is something to
explain.
PSYCHOSIS: THE SELF-DECEIVING STATE
By anthropomorphic analogy, part of the explanation
can be sought in how the State perceives reality.
Human psychosis can be defined as 'any form of severe
mental disorder in which the individual's contact with
reality becomes highly distorted'. In this sense, in the
illustrations presented above the State can be described
as psychotic: its contact with reality is distorted; it does
not respond to the misfit between intention and effect.
The thesis of this article is that much of the explanation
is to be found in false positive feedback, in
misperceptions and misinformation. There are dangers
here of exaggeration. In India, the Programme
Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission
has a good track record with its investigations and
reporting which some Northern countries could do
well to emulate. The National Sample Survey has a well
deserved international reputation for the quality of its
work. But most of the time, for most field organizations
and programmes, misinformation cloaks the truth: the
misfit of 'Model T' programmes is not seen. The
Emperor, though naked, is reported by sources close to
him to have clothes.
How does this come about?
False Positive Feedback
False positive feedback is mediated in five main ways.
These are misreporting; selected perception; methods
which mislead; diplomatic prudence; and defences
against dissonance.
1 Misreporting
Perhaps the most pervasive source of misleading
positive feedback is misreporting. This is a syndrome of
interactions between:
- time-bound target-setting imposed top-down;
- performance judged on the reported achievement
of targets;
- a punitive style of management;
an overload of reporting (making exact reporting
impossible anyway);
- corruption (so that there are facts to conceal or
figures to change);
- tacit connivance between levels in hierarchies;
- knowledge that the 'Model T' does not fit or does
not work (leading to demoralization).
When these combine, as they eften do, targets tend to
be reported as achieved when they have not been, or at
least performance is exaggerated. The remarks of a
District Agricultural Officer to his subordinates in the
early l970s reflect conditions which still persist: 'We
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have achieved all our targets. Do you understand?
Make the necessary arrangements in your blocks'. In
these circumstances, the achievement of targets
becomes 'a largely book-keeping affair' (Mook
1974: 143).
When, in this style of management, targets are raised
annually, misreporting builds up misinformation
cumulatively. This occurred in India with annually
raised targets for areas under High-Yielding Varieties
of rice. For 1972/3, officially reported figures for the
area under paddy HYVs in two taluks (administrative
areas) in North Arcot District in Tamil Nadu were 39
and 48 per cent respectively, but a survey in 12
representative villages in the two areas gave a figure of
only 13 per cent (Chambers and Wickremanayake 1977).
In one of the villages, the survey showed less than
50 per cent adoption, but the reports of the hapless
Village Level Worker had risen to 95 per cent, leaving
him nowhere to go, and a problem with how to conceal
the truth from visiting senior officers. A growing
divergence between report and reality stresses the
reporter, who is then driven to make up the
appearances of reality in the cosmetic as well as
numerical sense.
Especially where corruption is involved, misreporting
takes the form of lies. Subsidies play a part here too. In
practice subsidies support corruption, providing a
surplus which can be extracted as rents. Subsidized
inputs (as in some agricultural extension) or assets (as
in the IRDP) are also patronage for staff who can share
them with some of those for whom they were not
intended, Reporting cannot, however, reveal this. It
has to be falsified to conceal it. So when corruption is
endemic, so is false reporting. Work is reported done
which has not been done, and workers paid who have
not been paid. Costs are inflated. In one case in 1989
this was by a factor of four: a Forest Department was
accounting a cost of Rs40 per running metre of
protective stone walling, when an NGO working on the
ground found the cost to be only RslO. Or again,
administrators receive figures which they know are
already false, and are then ordered by politicians to
falsify them further. In one technical department, the
annual meeting of some 500 senior staff is said to have
been confronted by their Chief Statistical Officer who
asked: 'Why do you all lie?' There was no reply. The
question was repeated. There was still no reply.
2 Selected perception
A second origin of misleading positive feedback is
special and unrepresentative sources of information.
Two phenomena interlink here: islands of salvation;
and rural development tourism.
Islands of salvation are villages, areas or projects which
have received special treatment. To an astonishing
degree, a single village or project can be quoted and
requoted back and forth at conferences and in papers
without any analysis of its atypicality. One village,
Ralegaon Shindi, in Maharashtra, has been repeatedly
cited as a model for sustainable environmental
management, although accounts agree that it has most
exceptional and unusual leadership; and it would seem
that it has never been replicated. One canal irrigation
cooperative, the Mohini Water Cooperative Society,
the recipient of extraordinarily privileged treatment
from Government, has been the source of a myth
accepted both by the Planning Commission in India
(GOl 1985: II: 82) and by authorities outside India.
This is that, to quote one, 'In Gujarat State in India,
the irrigation agency sells water volumetrically in bulk
to cooperatives, which distribute it and collect fees
from their members' (Repetto 1986: 33); in fact,
Mohini was probably almost or entirely alone in this
respect, and the myth of water cooperatives in Gujarat
had a capacity to spread not shared by the institution
itself (Chambers 1988: 59-62). Or take T and V. When
T and V was pioneered in India in the Chambal
Command Area, it achieved 'apparently astonishing
success', but this could be attributed to the 'pilot
project effect' - because the World Bank was
intensively involved, staff were therefore motivated,
and irrigation and input supplies arrived on time
(Moore 1984: 306-7). Specially nurtured and protected,
islands of salvation like these systematically mislead.
Rural development tourism - the brief rural visit by
the urban-based senior officer - reinforces the island
of salvation effect, being often directed to special places
and people. Visits by senior officers are usually planned
and orchestrated by local-level staff to ensure carefully
selected perception. Nationally renowned islands of
salvation are favourites for visits by VVIPs. At a more
humble level, Block development staff often have a
special village, and special 'tame' people in that village,
to solve the problem of how to mislead visitors. Rural
development tourism has other built-in biases against
perception of poverty and meeting poor people
(Chambers 1983: 10-25). In agricultural extension,
farmers are rehearsed in the answers they are to give;
and the resource-rich farmer (known variously as a
master, model, demonstration, progressive, or contact,
farmer) who is visited can show the package of practices
in the field before presenting the visitor's book to be
signed. In canal irrigation, a warabandi committee is
mustered, though it only exists when visitors come. In
watershed development, the area visited in the
watershed follows the road along the top of a ridge
where erosion created by bad conservation works are
not to be seen. Experienced staff package their tours for
visitors, and in one case had a 'two hour treatment', and
a 'four hour treatment'. In the IRDP, the same poor
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person with the milch buffalo is shown off to a
succession of visitors to the village, and has been
carefully coached and supported by staff to ensure an
impression of dutiful success. Only the best is shown
and seen. Worse, the more senior and influential the
visitor, the more elaborate the preparations, and the
more biased the impressions. The glowing words of the
VIP in the visitor's book then reflect not the wider
reality, but the skill and care with which the visit was
managed.
3 Methods which mislead
A third source of positive bias can be found in the
methods used for monitoring, evaluation, research and
other investigation. Of these, the most common is the
questionnaire survey.
Questionnaire surveys are vulnerable to a host of
distortions, and especially to overfavourable
impressions of the achievements of government
programmes. Three examples - from agricultural
extension, watershed development, and the IRDP -
can serve as illustrations.
For agricultural extension, one survey conducted in
Hambantota District, Sri Lanka, found that 62 per cent
of farmers said they had been visited by extension
workers in a single season, while a more careful survey
found only 16 per cent and that over two seasons
(Chambers and Wickremanayake 1977: 158-9). The
first figure was absurd, and the second still most
improbably high.
For watershed development, a questionnaire survey
reported that only one farmer out of 272 (or 0.4 per cent
of farmers) interviewed was cross ploughing (a practice
frowned on by agricultural extension) while questions
posed after group discussions yielded 28 per cent (a
figure suggested by field observation to be closer to
reality) (pers. comm. C. Sitapathi Rao).
For the IRDP, Dreze's (1990) persuasive analysis has
shown that a greatly inflated impression of success was
given by the methods used in evaluations. Among
these, one was a question to beneficiaries (who were all
meant to be initially below the poverty line, but who
often were not) as to whether they had been below the
poverty line three years earlier when they joined the
programme. Not surprisingly, positive responses were
high, over 85 per cent, a figure suggested by other
evidence to be far wide of the mark.
In these three examples, there was overfavourable
distortion of the reality. The strongest explanations are
that informants knew what the 'right' answer was, and
gave it, for reasons of prudence or deference; and that
enumerators knew what responses were hoped for, and
recorded them. When such distortions operate,
positive responses to more general questions about the
value of a programme have little credibility.
When such biases can occur, monitoring, evaluation
and research data from questionnaire surveys about
government programmes are open to challenge. One
can ask, for example, what credence can be placed in
the reported negative replies of farmers when asked if
they have been visited by extension agents. A study of
T and V extension impact in Northern India (Feder
et al 1988: 82) examined T and V evaluation reports
from seven states. The average percentages of'no visits'
from extension were 15 per cent for contact farmers,
and 34.5 per cent for non-contact farmers (i.e. those
meant to meet the contact farmers). The study
concludes that 'The demand for T and V extension
services as measured by non-contact farmers' inter-
action with extension agents thus appears significant.'
But since farmer respondents must have known that
contact was meant to take place, a similar distortion
could be expected to that with reported cross-
ploughing; it would seem likely that actual 'no visits'
would be much larger than reported. On similar lines,
other monitoring and evaluation data from
questionnaires are open to queston for overfavourable
methodological bias.
4 Diplomacy and prudence
The fourth source of positive bias is diplomatic
prudence on the part of those engaged in research,
monitoring, evaluation and consultancy. To put it
bluntly, consultants and researchers do not want to bite
the hand that feeds them.
The World Bank in India commissioned research by a
large consultancy organization to assess the impact of a
policy the Bank was known to be keen to promote. This
was the subdivision of chaks - the areas below outlets
on canal irrigation systems .- into 8 ha subchaks, and
then the rotation of water between the subchaks. The
consultants conducted the research and concluded that
this preferred interventon led to benefits in higher
yields, more uniform yields, and less time taken to
irrigate. The World Bank and the Indian Government
adopted the policy. But a tiresome analysis (Chambers
1988: 54-59) of the evidence in the report indicated that
none of these conclusions was supported, and that
another factor, a good water supply, was the key
variable. It was difficult to avoid confirming the
hypothesis that the consultants had produced the
answer they knew was wanted.
More widespread than such misinterpretation of data,
is the more insidious self-censorship by those (and who
is without guilt?) who conduct commissioned research.
The conflicts will be familiar to some who read this. Do
honest consultants who write the truth find it easier or
harder to get further work?
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5 Defences against dissonance
Even if bad news is reported, it may be avoided or
rejected. In Ralph Waldo Emerson's words 'People
only see what they are prepared to see.'
On avoidance, independent researchers were once
invited to a workshop at the World Bank to present
their findings from field research on a World Bank
supported project. These were negative compared with
a mid-term review. One staff member, who had taken
part in the mid-term review, came to the session,
listened, was convinced, and said he regretted the
errors. But other staff members who were also involved
did not come to the meeting. Whatever the reasons, an
obvious conjecture is that they did not want to know.
By not being present, they did not have to know.
Avoidance worked.
On rejection, in the case of the consultant's report cited
above on subdivision of chaks and rotation of water
supplies, a meeting was called to discuss interpretation
of the data. The critic's points were half accepted but
then finessed into a sort of limbo. The misleading
conclusions drawn by the consultants were then, far
from being rejected or modified, actually published
unchanged, and without reference to the criticisms
(Chadha 1981).
As defences, these five sources of self-deception
interlink. Those who deceive know that those they are
deceiving know they are being deceived but also that
they want to be deceived in a way that does not show
that they know. So there is implicit connivance,
captured in the following personal communication
(April 1992):
JAS Officer: 'I said to my BDOs - you must each
have a VIP circuit. It is part of the game.'
Question: 'Do the VIPs know that they are being
given this treatment? Do they know they
are not getting the truth?'
JAS Officer: 'They don't want to know. For them, it
would only make trouble.'
These five sources of misinformation are mutually
reinforcing. The flows of misleading positive feedback
to which they give rise are homeostatic - conservative
at the centre through misperception of the periphery.
They reinforce top-down reflexes. The single universal
solution when inspected on rural visits is seen to do
well; routine reports rarely damn; independent
evaluations confirm the impression; prudent res-
pondents, researchers, evaluators and consultants
refrain from brutal honesty; and when bad news does
get through, it may be rejected. So though local
conditions differ, evidence of misfits is filtered out.
Positive misinformation props up standard pro-
grammes. Psychotic, the State deceives itself.
The Costs of Self-Deception and Error
In India, the costs of self-deception are enormous.
First, there are the direct financial costs in vast
programmes of misdirected and unproductive agri-
cultural research and extension, of erroneous irrigation
development, of blueprinted watershed development,
and of the misjudged priorities of the IRDP. Second,
there is the demoralization of field staff who find
themselves required to extend advice, or negotiate and
impose programmes, which people do not want and
which do not make sense. Third, there is the alienation
of the public, whose cynical realism about the State is
reinforced. And for all these, there are the opportunity
costs of foregoing the alternatives. Similar costs are
likely in other countries, but cases will differ.
Worldwide, the costs of past and present error are
beyond any calculation. Large-scale investment for
research and programmes to reduce post-harvest losses
of grain at the village level can now be seen to have been
based on a largely false premise. Nutrition programmes
which heavily stressed protein rather than calories
missed the mark. In environmental matters, mis-
diagnosis may be a special risk because of dogmatic
convictions about the unknowable and the next decade
may reveal gross error in some current conventional
wisdom and prescriptions. For development policy and
action generally, the question now is how to enable the
State, and the development professions, to be closer in
touch with reality.
IN SEARCH OF THERAPY
Reversals for Local Diversity
With accelerating change, with declining resources for
development, and with widespread and often increasing
deprivation, it matters more than ever for policy
makers and professionals to be right about what is
happening. The evidence and argument above suggest
that the more top-down, supply-driven and standardized
a programme package is, the more likely misleading
positive feedback becomes. The converse is that the
more bottom-up, demand drawn and diverse a
programme is, the closer will be the fit between data
and reality. The key is reversals of the normal, as in
each of the four domains of rural development
discussed above.
In agriculture, the change is from the T and V
approach of transfer of technology (TOT), to what has
been described as farmer participatory research
(Farrington and Martin 1988) or 'farmer-first'
(Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp 1989). In the TOT
mode, research priorities are decided by scientists;
technology is developed by them on research stations
and in laboratories; and recommended packages of
practices are then passed to extension organizations for
transfer to farmers. TOT has had successes with some
green revolution agriculture where environments could
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be controlled for a uniform fit, but a poor record with
rainfed agriculture which is more complex, diverse,
and risk-prone. In the reversed, contrasting, farmer-
first mode, analysis is carried out more by farmers
themselves; technology is developed and adapted more
on farm and by farmers; baskets of choices for farmers
replace packages of practices; and farmers' own
capabilities are enhanced and experiments supported.
Innovations in seed-breeding illustrate the shift from a
top-down 'Model T' approach. In the normal
professional mode in India, breeders make crosses,
screen lines for good characteristics such as disease
resistance and yield, and then select only a very few,
perhaps two or three, out of as many as two hundred
lines for assessment by a central committee. The
committee chooses material for multi-locational
testing, following which those lines judged best are
chosen, certified, and passed on for seed multiplication
as a stable, standard output, and then for Extension to
transfer to farmers. Before 'adoption', farmers play no
part, and much promising genetic material is lost. In
contrast, D. M. Maurya (Maurya er al 1988; Maurya
1989) of the Narendra Deva University of Agriculture
and Technology in Uttar Pradesh has been making a
wider range of lines available directly to farmers for
them to try out, on condition that if other farmers ask
for seed, they will also give some back to him. Farmers
thus have a wider choice, and themselves test, evaluate
and disseminate, for their diverse and particular
conditions. The package with a single seed has been
replaced by a basket with choices.
In canal irrigation, two forms of reversal can be
noted. The first is the participation of farmers in
determining how they wish to distribute water among
themselves. This has been the focus of much research
and writing. The second is appraisal and analysis of
each irrigation project separately leading to operational
plans which are tailor-made. In India this approach has
been central to the National Water Management
Project, and contrasts with the longer-standing
Command Area Development Programme which has
sought to implement warabandi and other standard
measures over most large projects.
In watershed development, the major reversal is to
involve farmers themselves in appraisal, mapping,
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
for the development of their watersheds (Mascarenhas
199!; Shah et al 1991). Participatory evaluation has
been the most recent development (SDC 1991). In late
1991, in a participatory evaluation involving farmers,
MYRADA (an NGO), the Drylands Development
Board of Karnataka, and the Swiss Development
Corporation, farmers were empowered to demonstrate
and argue the merits of their own soil and water
conservation works. Participatory appraisals in the
field were followed by farmers' presentations backed
up through showing and explaining slides of their fields
and of alternative technologies, to senior officials in
Bangalore. This led to Government agreement to
modify its standard ('Model T') soil conservation
structures to benefit from farmers' technology and to
conform closer to farmers' priorities (pers. comm.
Martin Sommer).
In anti-poverty programmes, the major reversal is
to allow poor people to choose when they need
support, by providing them with optional safety nets.
The classic example is the Maharashtra Employment
Guarantee Scheme, where the policy was that groups
could demand as of right to be given work when they
needed it, and to be paid a daily wage if work could not
be provided.
All four sets of reversals share common features. All
allow for local diversity. All empower local people with
choice. There is a shift from standardization to
differentiation, from a package of practices to basket of
choices, from the black 'Model T' to the Toyota with its
colour chosen by each client. Decision-making is
decentralized to people with local knowledge and
reasons to want it accurate. All sets of reversals make
lateral links between people and knowledge and short-
circuit the vertical channels of communication which
so often distort. All are thus therapeutic for the
psychotic State.
Rights, Communications and Empowerment
Therapy often meets resistance in the patient. With the
psychotic State, much of the resistance originates in the
vested interests of politicians, officials and contractors.
They often have personal and pecuniary interests in
maintaining and exploiting the system through hiding
or distorting information.
Corruption and the extraction of rents are hidden by
falsifying or withholding information. Reports passed
upwards conceal the pickings from construction and
maintenance in canal irrigation and watershed
development, or the routinized rents extracted from
IRDP subsidized loans and purchases. Reports falsify
statements of work completed, of prices paid, of people
employed, of benefits disbursed, and of services
rendered.
Rents are levered from the public by withholding
information, wilfully misleading, and spreading lies. In
canal irrigation, this takes the form of not informing
farmers about water supplies, even when they are
known, and of pretending that water is scarcer than it
is. When farmers are uncertain how much water is
available, believe it is short, and do not know how much
they will receive or when, they pay up in the hope of
assuring themselves a supply. In social forestry, this
can take the form of pretending to farmers that the
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cutting and transit of trees are prohibited when they are
not. In ways such as these, officials manage and
manipulate information to gain power and profit for
themselves and for their patrons and allies.
Therapy can take many forms. Among the more
obvious is clear definition of people's rights together
with multiple channel dissemination of information
about those rights. The rights can concern, for
instance, access to supplies of new seeds, supplies of
irrigation water, physical on-farm conservation works
according to farmers' plans and priorities, subsidized
loans, or freedom to cut and transit trees, all of these
without having to pay for them. The multiple channels
can include village meetings, handbills, notices,
broadcasts, videos and television broadcasts. The
communications revolution of the 1 990s will present
new opportunities to inform people of their rights, and
could be used to encourage them to organize, to resist
extortion, and to make demands for their entitlements.
Free communication about rights requires open
government. It requires that Government circulars be
made public. In India this has begun to happen, for
example with a Government Order of 1 June 1990
concerning involvement of village communities and
voluntary agencies for regeneration of degraded forest
lands, which was published in Wastelands News, the
widely circulated bulletin of the Society for the
Promotion of Wastelands Development.
Effective therapy can also occur through citizens
themselves making information public. Sometimes
corruption at the grassroots appears an ecological
condition as unalterable as climate, a fact of life to be
accepted. But at Ahmadpur in Latur District in India, a
voluntary agency brought out a handbill which said:
'Report a case of corruption and get the bribe-
money back.'
Villagers met on an appointed day and testified to
payments made. Officials were told that prosecution
was not sought, only return of the money. The results
reported were dramatic. Some officials asked for time
to pay, but in all cases bribes were returned, the sums
being designated as money that had been 'lent'
(Joshi 1989).
In various ways, then, rights, information and
communications can empower and enable individuals
and organizations to make demands for good and
honest service. The reversals implied will be resisted by
those - mainly lower-level officials - who stand to
lose. But the determination of policy and information
resides higher up in the hierarchy; and there, in central
administrative places, are to be found officials and
political leaders whose behaviour is not fully
determined, who do have room for manoeuvre, and
who do have power to modify and reform the system,
especially through their use of communications, if they
wish.
Personal Reversals and Realism: Truth, Trust
and Diversity
'If they wish' is the crux. Therapy through reversals for
diversity, and through rights, information and
empowerment, can only occur through the behaviour
of people. In the reform of any administrative culture,
there are questions of who starts and where. The key
people are those in a position to take and implement
decisions. For those who work in large bureaucracies
there are many obstacles to change on which much has
been written. But the personal, psychological
dimensions of these obstacles, and of the reversals to
overcome them, have tended to be neglected.
The first reversal concerns knowledge, and attitudes to
information and error. The normal pathology of the
self-deceiving state is mirrored by the normal
pathology of self-deceiving individuals and professions.
Even psychotherapists themselves lack feedback on the
effectiveness of their work and are said not to seem
interested in it (Howarth 1989). '1 would rather not
know' captures a common attitude of prudent self-
defence among those with responsibility for actions and
programmes who know or suspect that appearances are
false. To turn the blind eye, to avoid facing awkward
facts, to bury error, and to believe against the evidence
that what one is doing is good, these are common
failings in the human condition. The challenge is to
abandon concealment, to be open about error, and to
want to face factual reality. The reversal is to seek, and
be honest about, the truth.
The second reversal concerns the common admini-
strative reflex of control, and the drive to control more
rather than less. In March 1992, a group of Indian
administrators were asked what would be the basic
minimum to be standardized and regulated in setting
up village-level savings and credit societies. Their
collective list included rates of saving, application
forms, eligibility, purposes of loans, rates of interest,
repayments, penalties for default, and credit ratios. In
contrast, the programme of over 1,600 savings and
credit societies spread and supervised by MYRADA,
an NGO in South India, entrusted all these aspects to
individual societies to decide, and limited control and
supervision to accounts, records and bookkeeping. The
members of the societies and their committees had
discretion to meet their diverse needs in their own way,
and each society made its own rules for loans, interest
rates, penalties for defaulters, and so on. The challenge
posed by this example is to see the minimum that does
need to be controlled - the bookkeeping, and the
wisdom and courage to control no more than that, for
all else trusting people to make their own decisions.
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The reversal, in short, is to replace control with trust.
The third reversal concerns standardization. To fit the
diversity of social, economic and ecological conditions
requires a decentralized plurality of organizations,
services, activities and choices. But control centralizes
and standardizes. Caution calls for care to guard against
all imaginable error or deviation, and for uniform and
universal regulations to prevent these. Local discretion
is limited. The credit and savings societies need more
choice of what to do and how to do it. The reversal here
is to replace uniformity with diversity.
These three reversals - concerning truth, trust and
diversity - combine against the self-deceiving state.
But officials trapped in hierarchy and a web of
corruption and misinformation, can seem to have little
incentive for change and little room for manoeuvre.
And there are costs for them: truth embarrasses; trust
weakens authority; diversity undermines control. And
introduced together in a corrupt system, truth, trust
and diversity reduce the incomes of officials and
politicians.
Practical Theory
It is at this point that most academic analysts give up.
But the same is not true of courageous officials who
struggle to act as therapists from within. For them,
there are no easy solutions, but two approaches can be
proposed: working with allies; and direct personal field
experience.
Allies for those who want to change can be found both
within and outside government organizations. Within
government organizations, informal networks of the
like-minded can support each other. Outside govern-
ment organizations, support can be found in NGOs,
aid agencies and foundations, and among academics.
NGOs can have several roles as allies, empowering
local groups to make demands, training government
staff, setting examples by implementing programmes
for government, raising questions about corruption
and low standards, exposing the misfit of government
'Model Ts', and developing participatory approaches
and methods and training and socializing government
staff to use them. For their part, aid agencies and
foundations can use the leverage of funding to back
participatory programmes, innovations, training and
the like. The Ford Foundation has shown the potential
from professional interaction in support of bureaucratic
reorientation, as in the now classic case of the National
Irrigation Administration in the Philippines (Korten
and Siy 1989; Bagadion and Korten 1991). There, the
changes introduced and evolved touched many aspects
of participation and management; and the key element,
modestly underacknowledged in the literature, was the
commitment, continuity and alliance over almost a
decade of two professionals, one in the NIA, and one in
the Ford Foundation. As so often, the history of a
success points to the primacy of the personal.
The question then becomes how to multiply and
strengthen personal commitment. One promising
answer is direct field experience for senior decision-
makers. Normally, the more senior a person becomes,
the more removed he or she is from rural realities
(though this is less true in East Africa, where so many
are farmers in their own right, than in most other
regions). New opportunities for direct interaction,
without the constraints of rural development tourism,
are now accessible with the approach and methods of
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (see e.g.
Mascarenhas et al 1991). In India, the 320-odd
probationers for the Indian Administrative Service
each year now use PRA methods in their village
fieldwork. Elsewhere, a few senior officers have been
on field camps organized by NGOs and have found it a
revealing and rewarding experience. A wide repertoire
of means for learning from rural people and about rural
conditions is now available. Besides requiring relatively
brief periods in the field, using these techniques is also
interesting and enjoyable. The questions now are how
well they can be used; how many can use them; and how
well they can effect reversals, through learning from
below, keeping up-to-date with change, and being
sensitive to diverse priorities, especially of those who
are poorer.
Neither working with allies, nor using and spreading
PRA, is an easy, quick or universal means to realism.
Nor are these more than two out of many interventions
which could be put forward, case by case, to reduce
misleading positive feedback, to limit corruption, and
to diversify away from 'Model T' approaches. But they
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